JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN AUTHORITARIAN AND HYBRID REGIMES

I completed my PhD titled “Judicial independence in authoritarian and hybrid regimes: lessons from Pakistan” at the Department of Politics, University of York in 2020. Using the case of Pakistan, my PhD dissertation answers the question: How and why does the judiciary increase its independence against authoritarian and hybrid regimes? An authoritarian regime refers to one where powers are centralised in an office held by an individual or a group. A hybrid regime has a mix of autocratic and democratic features. Unelected forces such as the military influences politics from behind the scenes in hybrid regimes.  Authoritarian and hybrid regimes generally control the judiciary, but they failed to do so in Pakistan after 2005.

Before 2005, the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) was unable to protect itself against court-packing and court-curbing actions of authoritarian and hybrid regimes. However, after 2005, the SCP was not only able to protect itself against regime’s court-packing and court-curbing actions but also behaved independently against the political interests of other branches of the state. My PhD dissertation explained that a combination of social, political, and legal factors contributes to the increase in judicial independence in authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Different social and political groups helped the judiciary protect itself against regimes’ court-packing and court-curbing actions and behave independently against authoritarian and hybrid regimes like those in Pakistan from 2005 onwards.

Building upon my doctoral research, my postdoctoral fellowship at the School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University aims to publish a monograph and two articles on comparative analysis of judicial independence in aforementioned regimes and disseminate my PhD findings through a workshop.

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